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explanatory power is greater than that of atheism. But as John Hick has 
highlighted in his work, religious experience is itself something that both 
the religious believer and atheist must explain. Another possibility is that 
the author decided not to address both religious experience and the eviden-
tial problem because of his desire to produce a book suitable also for a meta-
physics course. (See my comments below on the book's suitability as a text.) 
2. See e.g., R. B. Braithwaite, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of 
Religious Belief," in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey 
(London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 53-73; and possibly D. Z. Phillips, The 
Concept of Prayer, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). 
3. Such a view is parallel to the meta-ethical error theory of J. L. Mackie. 
See Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 
35. 
4. I am not here assuming that the notion of a spiritual goal or truth 
need necessarilv be tied to belief in a transcendent God. However, it does 
seem plausible to me that a genuine distinction between what is spiritual vs. 
moral or psychological presupposes metaphysical claims of some kind. 
Anglo-American Postmodemity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, 
and Ethics by Nancey Murphy. Westview Press, 1977. Pp. xxi, 228. 
MEROLD WESTPHAL, Fordham University 
According to tills brilliant book, "our Western conceptual scheme, at its most 
basic level, is in the process of change," change so "drastic" that the "radical 
discontinuity" between ourselves and our most recent predecessors is as 
great as that "between Descartes and his Jesuit teachers" (pp. 1-2). What 
makes the argument so bold and challenging is that Murphy locates this sea 
change, not in the French, poststructuralist philosophies of flux and trans-
gression but in an Anglo-American scene in which Austin, Quine, and Kuhn 
rather than Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard represent philosophy's answer to 
the three tenors. 
More specifically, Murphy locates the change as occurring in epistemolo-
gy, philosophy of language, metaphysics; and, since the three themes or 
strategies being overthrown and replaced can well be taken as utterly basic 
to philosophical modernity, she appropriates the rubric 'postrnodernism' 
from the French as the most informative name for the intellectual revolution 
she explores. 
In epistemology, modernism is characterized by foundationalism. 
Murphy does not distinguish between 1) the weak foundationalism that 
merely claims that while some of our beliefs rest on other beliefs, other, basic 
beliefs do not and 2) the strong foundationalism that permits as properly 
basic only those beliefs which, by virtue of the certainty pertaining to them, 
can provide a fundamentum inconcussum for the edifice of knowledge. Most 
of the time when people talk about the collapse of foundationalism it is 
strong foundationalism that they have in mind; and many, if not most, of the 
arguments against the certainty claims of strong foundationalism take the 
form of attacks on the weak foundationalism it presupposes. Murphy's 
argument follows tills pattern. 
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In philosophy of language, modernity is characterized by a representa-
tional or referential view according to which the primary task of language is 
to describe facts, to mirror the world. And in metaphysics, modernity is 
characterized by an atomistic individualism that goes hand in glove with a 
reductionism in which complex wholes are nothing but a function of the 
parts which make them up. 
Much of the time Murphy talks as if holism is the postmodem response to 
the metaphysical atomism that makes reductionism look plausible in philos-
ophy of science and social theory, but a closer look at her argument makes it 
clear that Anglo-American postmodernism is a series of holistic responses to 
the theses of modernity. In epistemology, foundationalism (both weak and 
strong) collapses when we take seriously such phenomena as the theory-
ladenness of the facts that are supposed to confirm the theories. The web 
(Quine) and the paradigm or research program (Kuhn) replace the atomistic 
image of knowledge as a building. 
In philosophy of language, Austinian-Wittgensteinian speech act theory 
calls our attention to the fact that describing or asserting facts is only one use 
to which language is put and that meaning, accordingly, is a function of usage 
rather than of reference. Since these usages are embedded in social practices 
that make up language games or even forms of life, the meanings of individ-
ual statements are a function of the contexts in which they occur and are relat-
ed to them very much as facts are related to theories - in a word, holistically. 
Finally, in metaphysics, supervenience theory leads the way in showing 
that entities composed of, say, physical parts can have, say, biological prop-
erties that are not explainable from those parts. Here once again, context is 
causally sigillficant. Holism signifies the reciprocal interaction of part (phys-
ical particle, statement, fact, person) and whole (field, language game, theo-
ry, society), of lower level and higher level. There is top down causality as 
well as bottom up. 
Chapter 1 sketches these changes. The next three chapters explore the 
philosophy of science in these terms. After briefly suggesting that holism 
undermines scientific realism, Murphy turns her attention to the specter of 
relativism raised by Quinean/Kuhnian holism and develops a sophisticated 
theory of justification drawing on Lakatos, Meyering, and MacIntyre. Its goal 
is to escape the dilemma of rationalism/skepticism by providing criteria for 
a "limited relativity or proliferation" (p. 65) of theories or research programs. 
Chapters 5 through 7 tum from science to theology. Murphy argues that 
the split in Protestantism between liberalism and fundamentalism is to be 
understood in terms of the philosophical modernity they shared. Thus, for 
example, it is foundationalist assumptions that lead to the attempts to make 
inerrant scripture or religious experience the basis of theology. Turning to 
postmodem resources for theology, Murphy sketches possibilities for a post-
conservative theology by analogy with the postliberal theology associated 
with Lindbeck and the Yale school. TI1e extrapolation of MacIntrye's theory 
of justification from science to theology plays a key role here and is an 
important preparation for the later claim that theology and ethics be includ-
ed among the sciences. 
Postconservative theology will appeal to biblical authority, and here the 
relativism that threatens concerns interpretation. Once again relativism is 
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not to be abolished but controlled so that we have "(relatively) stable linguis-
tic conventions, (approximate) fulfillment of a variety of relevant historical 
conditions, and close (enough) correspondence between what the authors 
intended to say and what they actually said" (p. 145). 
The final three chapters might be thought of as applications. Chapter 8 
argues that in the light of postmodern philosophy of science, religious experi-
ence can have evidential value for theological claims. Chapter 9 argues that 
the social sciences have value presuppositions, that they require ethics as a 
higher science to adjudicate those issues, and that ethics in tum requires theol-
ogy as a higher science to adjudicate its disputes. The final chapter is devoted 
to an analysis of supervenience and the non-reducibility of ethics to biology. 
Drawing creatively on a wide variety of literatures, Murphy offers many 
challenging claims deserving careful examination and wide discussion. But 
the reader should not look for help in grasping the relation between Anglo-
American and French postmodernism. Here Murphy's massive erudition 
fails her. Too dependent on secondary sources, she too readily passes on such 
popular but insupportable claims as that deconstruction refutes itself (p. 60), 
denies reference (p. 136, 140-41), and argues for a "total indeterminacy" of 
meaning (p. 141). The latter would be the case, of course, if the onlyalterna-
tive to total determinacy were total indeterminacy, but that is just the kind of 
modernist thinking Murphy herself repudiates in favor of meaning that is 
"(relatively) stable". So on her own account it simply doesn't follow from 
French arguments against total determinacy that the authors espouse total 
indeterminacy. 
A more helpful treatment would have asked: why is Anglo-American post-
modernism so preoccupied with the question of justification and its criteria 
while French postmodernism is not? No one, I think, can challenge that fact. 
But how to explain it? Perhaps the solution is to be found in that heritage of 
modernity that is most important to each side to preserve in some postmodern 
form. Modem philosophy was about justification in large measure because it 
was about critique. Anglo-American postmodernity asks the question: how is 
justification possible after foundationalism? French postmodernism asks the 
question: how is critique possible after foundationalism? 
Critique and justification were essentially inseparable in modernity. 
Perhaps they should be for postmodemity as well. Perhaps we should not 
think with Murphy of Anglo-American postmodernity as a safer alternative 
to the French versions but, to use one of her own phrases, seek "an integrat-
ing model" (p. 81) in which the two are, well, integrated. 
Rush Rhees: On Religion and Philosophy, edited by D.Z.Phillips. 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Ppxxii and 389. Cloth $69.95 
GORDON GRAHAM, University of Aberdeen 
Rush Rhees is best known not because of his philosophical writings, but 
because of his philosophical connexions. A student and friend of 
Wittgenstein (later one of his literary executors), he became the teacher 
